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SPECIAL MEETING

OF THE

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

CORRECTION SHEET

Page, Paragraph
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TEXT (Tentative and Final)

Page 4, Para. 2.

Tentative:

MR. ARMSTRONG said he would like to review the Department of State's position. He said that his Department had from the beginning of this "charter" problem taken the position that the National Security Council is the proper "parent" body for USCIB. He added that the Department of State still considers this to be the case. Thus, he said, the draft NSCID up for consideration at the present meeting had returned USCIB to its proper sphere. He added that, however, in examining this draft the Department of State representatives had concluded that certain changes might be mutually acceptable and beneficial to USCIB members. Thus, for example, he said, it had been considered that certain of the provisions in the draft might better be handled by later, implementing directives and some of the phraseology involving repetition could be improved. He added that the result of these conclusions took shape as an alternate draft of the NSCID which was somewhat shorter but essentially the same as the CIA's draft. He said that at some time during the deliberations on the "charter" problem the Department of State desired that its alternate draft be put forward for consideration by the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC). He asked whether those present desired to consider the two drafts simultaneously or preferred to postpone consideration of the Department of State's draft until the CIA's draft had been checked. He said that perhaps Admiral Hillenkoetter had decided how this should be handled.

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Page 4, Para. 2.

Final:

TEXT (Tentative and Final)

MR. ARMSTRONG said he would like to review the Department of State's position. He said that his Department had from the beginning of the "charter problem" taken the position that the National Security Council is the proper "parent" body for USCIB. He added that the Department of State still considers this to be the case. Thus, he said, the draft NSCID up for consideration at the present meeting had returned the question of "parentage" to the sphere upon which the Department had previously expressed agreement. He added that, however, in examining this draft the Department of State representatives had concluded that certain changes might be mutually acceptable and beneficial to USCIB members. Thus, for example, he said, it had been considered that certain of the provisions in the draft might better be handled by later, implementing directives and some of the phraseology involving repetition could be improved. He added that the result of these conclusions took shape as an alternate draft of the NSCID which was somewhat shorter but essentially the same as the CIA's draft. He said that he wished to ask a procedural question in that at some time during the deliberations on the "charter problem" the Department of State desired that its alternate draft be put forward for consideration by the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC). He asked whether those present desired to consider the two drafts simultaneously or preferred to postpone consideration of the Department of State's draft until the CIA's draft had been checked. He said that perhaps Admiral Hillenkoetter could decide how this should be handled.

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TEXT (Tentative and Final)

Page 4, Para. 3,
Lines 1 & 2.

Tentative: ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER said he
would leave the decision to IAC members.

Final: ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER said he
would leave the decision to members.

Page 4, Para. 6.

Tentative: ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER asked MR.
ARMSTRONG'S opinion and the latter
said he would reserve comment until
Department of State's alternate draft
had come up for consideration. AD-
MIRAL STONE endorsed the Navy's para-
graph 1 as written.

Final: ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER asked MR.
ARMSTRONG's opinion and the latter
said he would prefer to reserve his
comments until the Department of
State's alternate draft had come up
for consideration. ADMIRAL STONE
endorsed the Navy's paragraph 1 as
written.

Page 5, Para. 9,
Line 1.

Tentative: ADMIRAL STONE said he would defer
to the wishes of the IAC-----

Final: ADMIRAL STONE said he would defer
to the wishes of the members-----

Page 6, Para. 5,
Lines 1 & 2.

Tentative: ---- In reply, ADMIRALS HILLENKOETTER
and INGJIS expressed the view that the
NSA prescribes a member of functions---

Final: ---- In reply, ADMIRALS HILLENKOETTER
and INGLIS expressed the view that the
NSA prescribes a number of functions--

Page 12, Para. 7.

Tentative: COLONEL HAYES said that an addi-
tional point was that the actual im-
plementation of such directives within
the member departments or agencies
should be handled by them.

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TEXT (Tentative and Final)

Page 12, Para. 7.

Final:

COLONEL HAYES said that an additional point was that the actual implementation of such directives within the member departments or agencies should be handled by the Departments.

Page 12, Para. 11.

Tentative:

MR. ARMSTRONG asked whether this suggested wording would not act to deprive the Director of Central Intelligence of a function delegated to him by the National Security Act wherein he is designated as the agent for carrying out the NSC's Intelligence Directives.

Final:

MR. ARMSTRONG asked whether the suggested wording would not act to deprive the Director of Central Intelligence of a responsibility imposed upon him by the National Security Act wherein he is designated as the agent for carrying out the NSC's Intelligence Directives.

Page 13, Para. 7.

Tentative:

Omitted.

Final:

MR. ARMSTRONG suggested that the paragraph be converted from the negative to the positive approach by rewording it as follows: "The Board shall leave the internal administration and management of communication intelligence activities to the member departments and agencies."

Page 14, Para. 1.

Tentative:

MR. ARMSTRONG suggested deleting the paragraph altogether as it merely confused the coordination issue.

Final:

MR. ARMSTRONG suggested deleting the paragraph altogether on two grounds; one, that it tended to confuse the duties of the CJO with the overall coordinating responsibility of the DCI, and, two, that the duties of the CJO would be more properly set forth in an implementing directive.

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TEXT (Tentative and Final)

Page 14, Para. 3.

Tentative:

MR. ARMSTRONG said he considered the duties and responsibilities of the CJO would be best handled by an implementing directive under the NSCID.

Final:

MR. ARMSTRONG reiterated that he considered the duties and responsibilities of the CJO would be best handled by an implementing directive under the NSCID.

Page 14, Para. 4.

Tentative:

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said he considered the CJO to be the key to the whole USCIB structure, and ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER agreed.

Final:

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said he considered the CJO to be the key to the whole USCIB structure.

Page 14, Para. 5,
Line 1.

Tentative:

The latter added that he had---

Final:

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER added that he had-----

Page 15, Para. 9.

Tentative:

MR. ARMSTRONG said his office had prepared the alternate version as a result of the belief that a better organized and somewhat shorter directive would be desirable. He said that one change had been to reorganize the draft so that it preceded from the general to the specific parts of the plan, and another had been to omit some features which, it had been considered, would more appropriately be handled by means of implementing directives or are already implicit in the language of the NSA. He outlined further differences between the Department of State's draft and the CIA's draft and added that those who had prepared the former paper had not considered command problems in the field because they had not believed that the NSCID would affect field commanders directly.

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TEXT (Tentative and Final)

Page 15, Para. 9.

Final:

MR. ARMSTRONG said his office had prepared an alternate version as a result of the belief that a better organized and somewhat shorter directive could be attained. He said that one change had been to reorganize the draft so that it proceeded from the general to the specific parts of the charter, and another had been to omit some features which, it had been considered, would more appropriately be handled by means of implementing directives or are already implicit in the language of the NSA. He outlined further differences between the Department of State's draft and the CIA's draft and added that those who had prepared the former paper had not considered command problems in the field because they had not believed that the NSCID would affect field commanders directly. He continued that the principle change was in the deletion of the second part of paragraph 1 of the CIA's draft and in a transfer of the relationship of USCIB to the Director of Central Intelligence to a new paragraph (paragraph 5), the concept of which also extends to all other relations between USCIB and the Director.

Page 16, Para. 4.

Tentative:

MEMBERS discussed the Department of State's draft and MR. ARMSTRONG, after reviewing the differences between the two drafts, expressed his willingness to take the CIA draft under advisement if all other members present preferred that version. He added that, after study, he would advise the Chairman of IAC regarding the Department of State's position.

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Page 16., Para. 4. Final:

TEXT (Tentative and Final)

MEMBERS then discussed the Department of State's draft, and it emerged that some members were not prepared to consider it in detail at that time, but would prefer its reference to a working group for reconciliation with the CIA version. MR. ARMSTRONG, after further reviewing the differences between the two drafts, stated that in the interest of expediting the matter he was willing to take the CIA draft, as amended during the meeting, under advisement and inform the DCI as soon as possible as to the Department's concurrence or further suggestion.

Page 16, Para. 9. Tentative:

DECISION: The Intelligence Advisory Committee members and others present agreed to accept the Central Intelligence Agency's draft NSCID as amended during this Special Meeting, and directed the Ad Hoc Secretariat to prepare and circulate the amended version to IAC members present as well as to the Chief of Naval Communications and the Chief of the Army Security Agency for study and comment.

Final:

DECISION It was agreed that, subject to the reservations expressed during the Meeting, the Central Intelligence Agency's draft NSCID as amended during this Special Meeting would be accepted. The Ad Hoc Secretariat was directed to prepare and circulate the amended version to those present for study and comment.

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